On February 11, the German newspaper Junge Welt published an article by Lars Lang titled “New Warfare Doctrine,” analyzing Russia’s evolving approach in Ukraine. The following is a summary of its key points.
I. Russia Implements a New Warfare Doctrine in Ukraine
Junge Welt writes that Russia is conducting its operations in Ukraine using a new methodology that the West struggles to comprehend. Moscow has opted for a strategy of systemic control: the focus is not on who occupies more territory, but on whose system proves more durable. In the conflict, Russia is not seeking a decisive battle but views the current front line within the broader context of a process designed to exhaust the enemy. This article details Moscow’s systemic control warfare approach.
Western experts often measure the conflict by the meters advanced per day. According to new calculations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), since early 2024, Russian forces have advanced an average of 15-70 meters per day. This is slower than the pace during the 1916 Battle of the Somme. The British Telegraph reiterated this, stating Russian advances are slower than any other army in the last century. The Washington-based think tank concluded that Russia pays an extremely high price for minimal territorial gains, thereby gradually degrading into a second or third-tier power. It further suggested these results fundamentally do not bring Moscow closer to its goal of militarily conquering Ukraine.
However, this conclusion may be based on a category error. Since the spring of 2023, there have been no documented attempts by Russia to breach the enemy’s defensive depth along the front line. Neither massed tank assaults nor operational phases of developing an offensive have been observed. The Russian system appears less offensive-oriented than the Western model; it focuses on controlling the balance of forces and creating “attrition zones.” What Western observers perceive as “no offensive” might be a different understanding of effectiveness. There is no concept of a “winter offensive” here, but rather a continuous adjustment of one’s own effectiveness. Russia views the front line as a measure of the attrition process, not the objective itself. Operations function as a continuous control loop, where loss curves and operational effects are more important than territorial gains. If this interpretation is correct, victory is not achieved through territorial conquest but through the stability of the entire system: what matters is not who gains the most land, but whose condition lasts longer. Russia reduces pressure to the limit of its own stability while attempting to significantly overload the enemy’s system—until its logistics, mobilization, economy, or entire command structure collapses. The conflict ends not with a breakthrough, but with the systemic failure of one party.
II. The Fog of War Lifts
This style of operation can be termed systemic control warfare: a self-regulating system that learns and adapts through feedback. The conceptual foundation can be attributed to Soviet military theorist Aleksandr Svechin. For Svechin, military strategy was not a plan but a continuous reaction to changing situations. While Clausewitz placed decisive battles at the center, Svechin proposed a concept of universal adaptation: war as a continuous process of strategic adjustment. In this sense, today’s Russian model seems more “Svechinian” than “Clausewitzian.” This leads to a formula: Svechin’s military model plus digitalization. The theoretical bridge here is American mathematician Norbert Wiener, founder of cybernetics, who defined it as the science of control and regulation through feedback: systems observe their environment, process data, and correct behavior.
Executing conflict in this cybernetic manner means organizing operations as a control loop designed to inflict maximum systemic damage on the enemy at minimal personal cost. This fundamentally differs from previous attempts to “rationalize” war. If US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Vietnam sought to retrospectively quantify success, such as with body counts, Russia has created an operational algorithm at the organizational level: shifting from reporting data to real-time feedback data. This mode of warfare can be described as a “digitized industrial attrition process”: Russia operates like a factory—based on big data and mass standardization. The primary goal is not territorial gain but the systematic weakening of the enemy’s system. This model is abstract and resembles a process, making it difficult for Western observers who measure success in kilometers to comprehend. Russia’s method operates on a different abstraction level: the West focuses on “stock value” like territorial control, while Russia relies on “flow value,” or cost-effectiveness over time.
The technological backbone is ESU-TZ, Russia’s unified tactical command and control system, integrating units, reconnaissance assets, and fire damage into a unified information domain. In this sense, it is similar to Western C2 systems but optimized for feedback and real-time adjustment. Sensors create a single information field, algorithms and models assist in target prioritization, and firing weapons have significantly shorter launch delays. This forms the computational core of the systemic control warfare model.
One of the most accurate descriptions of this new warfare style comes from Russia itself. Former Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (2004-2008) Yuri Baluyevsky and Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, published an article in December 2025 titled “Digital War is the New Reality,” describing events in Ukraine. They argue the main change is the complete transparency of the battlefield: the “fog of war” has lifted. Due to the proliferation of drones, satellite communications, and network sensors, a unified information environment is forming, where tactical, operational, and strategic levels functionally merge. Boundaries between interaction levels blur. A second fundamental change: the tactical battlefield and depths of dozens of kilometers into space are becoming “total destruction zones.” In these areas, any movement or concentration of forces is instantly detected and vulnerable. The result is extremely dispersed combat formations with very low density. Baluyevsky cites the emergence of global satellite networks like Starlink as a catalyst for this evolution. For the first time, an end-to-end, scalable information infrastructure exists, enabling feedback loops down to the lowest tactical level. Cybernetic logic appears not as theoretical schemes but through empirical observation, exemplified by three elements: the mass use of Geranium drones, the industrial application of glide bombs, and the organizational model of Russia’s Rubicon unmanned systems units.
III. A New Type of Drone Unit
The organizational embodiment of the cybernetic approach is seen in the Rubicon unmanned systems units. Established in August 2024 by order of Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Rubicon, unlike units handling “conventional” drones, reports directly to him. Rubicon combines the combat use, development, production, and testing of drones into an integrated model with feedback loops. The unit’s center includes its own development department, training centers, analytical units, and independent combat groups. A significant part of technical solutions comes from the so-called “people’s defense industry,” where private or small companies proactively create technology for the Russian military. Rubicon provides these developers with direct feedback on current front-line needs and problems. Successful solutions are scaled up and transitioned to mass production. The most prominent example is fiber-optic drones, immune to electronic interference. These systems were first tested in the Kursk region and deployed across the entire front within weeks.
The key distinction from traditional military structures is that Rubicon experiments within a military environment like a true startup—rapidly testing, with front-line feedback directly into the development system, while leveraging the state’s “vertical” structure to quickly propagate successful solutions to all armed forces. Ukraine innovates from the grassroots but seems to struggle with systematized innovation, whereas Russia can rapidly scale proven solutions across its entire military and defense industry. Rubicon combines both approaches.
IV. Old Equipment Elevated to a New Technical Level
This organizational innovation, however, only works effectively when paired with specific weapon systems embedded in cybernetic logic. The mass use of Russian glide bombs represents the functional development of older weapons. The core consists of standard Soviet-era aerial bombs fitted with relatively simple glide and guidance kits. Their industrial production is straightforward, with production lines existing for decades, and costs significantly lower than modern cruise missiles. But what has changed qualitatively is accuracy: in recent months, the precision of these munitions has markedly improved. Strike patterns show glide bombs precisely targeting specific fortifications: trench lines, bunkers, known assembly points, and rear supply routes. Entire sections of the front are being systematically “dismantled”—not through carpet bombing, but structurally, methodically, and persistently. This accuracy stems not only from the bomb’s technical components but from integrating them into a holistic sensor loop. Drone reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, and feedback from previous strikes allow for continuous refinement of target parameters.
The function of glide bombs is clear: they are designed for the selective destruction of deeply echeloned, fortified enemy defenses. In many places, Ukraine has spent years building fortifications—trench systems, concrete bunkers, interwoven supply lines, and rear strongpoints. It is precisely these structures that precision glide bombs destroy or neutralize. The result is the devaluation of positions, not necessarily immediate surrender. Shelters disappear, bunkers become unusable, logistics routes are severed. Advancing infantry then faces a fundamentally different combat environment: pushing into “softened” defenses with significantly reduced own losses. Within the logic of the cybernetic model, glide bombs are not blunt instruments but precise elements in a control loop. Low production cost, high usage frequency, and increasing accuracy combine with rapid feedback from the battlefield. The effect is not achieved at once but gradually optimized. Glide bombs reflect the nature of current combat: old structures, highly precise application principles, embedded in a continuous, data-based attrition process. This is not a sign of technological backwardness but an expression of a new methodology prioritizing efficiency over technical excellence.
V. The Goal is Collapse
If glide bombs target enemy fortifications, a second type of system strikes the infrastructure “behind” the defender. The Geranium drone embodies the principles of the industrial warfare model. According to Ukrainian data, up to 120,000 such systems have been used since 2022. Throughout 2025, the Geranium underwent several technological phases. Since summer, Russia has been equipping these drones with Chinese network modems and forward-facing cameras, enabling them to engage moving targets like locomotives and trains for the first time. Weapons originally designed for fixed targets are gradually becoming a multi-purpose platform. Their usage strategy is even more telling. In June 2025, Russia fundamentally changed its strike strategy. Moscow ceased launching irregular drone waves and instead established a continuous “background noise” of 50-100 Geranium flights daily, supplemented by weekly mass strikes combining over 500, and in some areas over 800, drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This combination of persistent load and periodic intense oversaturation is not improvisation but systemic, controlled fine-tuning.
The dramatic impact of this cumulative destruction became starkly evident in early February 2026. After months of systematic attacks on energy infrastructure, Ukraine experienced nationwide blackouts, even affecting parts of neighboring Moldova; the Kyiv metro also halted. The situation was described as apocalyptic. This collapse was not accidental but a predictable result of the industrial warfare model. Ukraine had only 11 GW of generating capacity left, needing 16-18 GW for winter. 70-90% of remaining power came from nuclear plants, which had to be partially reduced during outages. The Geranium, therefore, is not a “territorial” weapon. Its role is not to seize land but to exert immense pressure on the enemy’s national system—until it collapses. This is a quintessential cybernetic approach: sustained pressure, controlled intensity, measurable attrition, leading to systemic failure. However, the Geranium operates mainly in the strategic depth—industrial facilities, power plants and grids, urban infrastructure. There was a long-standing “gap” between the current battlefield and the strategic depth, which Moscow is now attempting to close.
VI. “Total Destruction Zones”
With the emergence of new medium-range drones, the geometry of the battlefield is fundamentally changing. A new Russian drone with a 300 km range bridges the gap between tactical FPV drones and strategic long-range weapons. Extremely simple and likely costing well under €10,000, it targets supply depots, command posts, and moving targets 100 to 300 km behind the front line. This enables what Baluyevsky calls “total destruction zones” to shift significantly deeper into what was previously the rear.
To understand this, it is necessary to distinguish two modes of applying military force: shock waves and constant pressure waves. A shock wave is a short, concentrated pulse attempting to impose force: massing fires in a short time for a local breakthrough, with significantly higher vulnerabilities and casualties for oneself. The goal is rapid change, territorial gain, and exploiting success. This is classic maneuver warfare. A constant pressure wave functions differently: it lasts a long time and covers a large area. Instead of a single “flash,” there is sustained, controlled pressure. Attacks are distributed across a wide space, each dosed, repeated, and modulated. Massed forces are not exposed. The goal is not a breakthrough but attrition: the enemy’s resources are gradually consumed, their reactions tested and exhausted. “Total destruction zones” arise not from shock waves but from constant pressure waves.
The battlefield can now be visualized as concentric rings of sustained pressure. The inner ring—from the front line to 30 km—has become an absolute “death zone”: equipment here can barely move. The middle ring—depth from about 30 to 300 km—is controlled by systems like the Geranium or Itarmas. Previously, this depth was considered a relatively safe rear for command posts, logistics hubs, and troop assembly points. The outer ring is covered by strategic weapons, capable of striking targets far beyond 1000 km. The crucial point is that these zones yield no territorial gain. They deliver systemic pressure. The traditional principle of distance as protection no longer applies. The concept of rear space becomes blurred. Consequently, the entire depth up to 300 km behind the front line transforms into a continuous pressure zone: not occupied, but functionally controlled through persistent threat.
VII. Power Through Separation
This “permeation” of the battlefield inevitably challenges conventional military concepts. The disintegration of traditional combined arms warfare is one consequence of underestimating systemic control warfare enabled by drones. Military analyst Jack Watling of the UK’s Royal United Services Institute illustrates this well. In a study last year, he wrote that FPV drones are “particularly effective when combined with other arms.” However, Russia’s elite Rubicon units demonstrate how drones work most effectively in practice: not in conjunction, but in separation. Rubicon operates autonomously, conducting its own reconnaissance and selecting targets—without tactical coordination with brigades, no maneuver tasks, no connection to “combined arms combat.” Its effectiveness stems precisely from separation, not integration: decentralization, operating as hunter-killer groups, not complex coordination, posing a continuous, 24/7 threat to the enemy. Rubicon is an autonomous destruction cluster.
Combined arms combat, conversely, relies on concentration of force, maneuver, surprise, timing, and mutual support. Tanks protect infantry, infantry supports tanks, artillery prepares the terrain—all elements work together. But on the “transparent” battlefield, these principles fail: any concentration of forces is detected remotely. Any movement attracts drones, making surprise nearly impossible. Coordination implies congestion, which becomes a target for FPV drone swarms. Tanks become priority prey for drone operators, infantry can barely maneuver. Combined arms is dismantled into its components because its key condition—limited visibility—has vanished. Watling’s error reflects Western thinking: attempting to fit new technology into old concepts. But drones are not an “add-on” to combined arms combat; they are replacing it.
VIII. Is the Tank Obsolete?
In the West, the tank’s crisis is often attributed to a lack of protection. This is inaccurate. The problem is structural. Tanks are designed as “direct-fire” platforms: they need to see a target to engage it. Drones do not require direct line of sight—they operate from a distance, controlled from dozens of kilometers away, engaging targets the operator sees only via video feed. This asymmetry is crucial: on the “transparent” battlefield, tanks are detected and engaged before they even enter their effective firing range. In August 2025, Ukrainian intelligence detected only 23 Russian tanks within 70 km of the front line, compared to 470 in the southern direction alone in May 2023. Tanks are not disappearing because they are vulnerable; they are largely disappearing because, for an industrialized attrition process, they are too expensive and too “exposed.” The same effect—attriting enemy forces—can be achieved through smaller, more controllable means. Tanks are primarily tools for countering maneuver and are ill-suited for systemic control warfare. The tank’s obsolescence is merely the most visible symptom of a broader shift in military paradigm. Western military thinkers struggle with this shift because it questions fundamental categories. Systemic control warfare, the “molecular” battlefield, autonomous destruction clusters, the blurring of operational depths, and the network of sensor effects as the primary weapon remain largely unexplored concepts in the West.
The confrontation in Ukraine is no longer a battlefield in the traditional sense. It is a rule-driven process where the intensity, frequency, and effect of strikes are continuously adjusted. Controllability of force application is more important than maximum rigidity. The fighting in Ukraine may be part of a longer-term training and adaptation process for the Russian military. Consequently, the main difference from previous forms of warfare lies not only in weapons or tactics but in the transition from engagement-oriented combat to protracted confrontation. Anyone who continues to measure the conflict in Ukraine in kilometers fails to grasp its primary logic.